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Abstract: This paper defends a conception of epistemic value that I call the 
“Simpliciter Conception.” On it, epistemic value is a kind of value 
simpliciter and being of epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. 
I defend this conception by criticizing two others, what I call the Formal 
Conception and the Hybrid Conception. While those conceptions may be 
popular among epistemologists, I argue that they fail to explain why 
anyone should care that things are of epistemic value and naturally 
undercuts disputes about what is of epistemic value. I end by sketching 
and locating my conception within some increasing popular views in 
meta-normativity.  
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 “But I doubt that anyone endorses epistemic standards on the grounds that they 
are one’s own; presumably they are invoked because they mark out something 
valuable, either intrinsically or extrinsically.” Goldman (1991: 189) 
 
The overall aim of this paper is to defend a conception of epistemic value that I call the 
Simpliciter Conception. On it, epistemic value is a kind of value simpliciter and being of 
epistemic value implies being of value simpliciter. I defend this conception by criticizing two 
alternatives. According to the Formal Conception, epistemic value is not a kind of value 
simpliciter; and being of epistemic value does not imply being of value simpliciter. According to 
the Hybrid Conception, epistemic value is not a kind of value simpliciter but being of epistemic 
value does imply being of value simpliciter. I argue that these conceptions fail to explain why 
anyone should care that things are of epistemic value. Additionally, they undercut philosophical 
disputes about what is of epistemic value.  
In section I, I characterize the target notion of final epistemic value a little more fully. In 
section II, I exposit the Formal Conception. In section III, I object that the Formal Conception 
fails to explain why it is appropriate for people to care that certain things are of epistemic value; 
I also object that the Formal Conception naturally undercuts the philosophical significance of 
disputes about what is of epistemic value. In section IV, I extend my objections to a Hybrid 
Conception of epistemic value, which maintains that the standards of the epistemic point of view 
are constituted by our states (beliefs) or activities (reasoning). In section V, I exposit the 
Simpliciter Conception and show how it avoids the problems of the Formal Conception and 
Hybrid Conception. Finally, in section VI, I explore what kinds of positions the Simpliciter 
Conception sits most naturally with, suggesting, without defending, a position I call Unified 
Simpliciter Conception about Epistemology.  
I. Final Epistemic Value 
Let’s begin with an initial characterization of epistemic value and a few distinctions. First, 




Something is of epistemic value if and only if it is valuable from the epistemic 
point of view. 
This naturally raises the question of what the epistemic point of view is. I take the epistemic 
point of view to contain the standards for epistemic evaluations. These standards take the form of 
statements articulating the conditions—necessary, sufficient, or paradigmatic—of when things 
have epistemic properties. The epistemic point of view contrasts with other points of view, such 
as the ethical point of view or the aesthetic point of view, as well as perhaps the religious, legal, 
prudential, etc. points of view.  
Second, we can mark a distinction between two types of epistemic value. Some things are of 
instrumental epistemic value. Something is of instrumental epistemic value when the overall 
epistemic value of its consequences is positive. But of course the value of consequences do not 
just go on forever; they ultimately bottom out in things that are not of instrumental epistemic 
value. While one can find a variety of terms in the literature, I’ll use the modifier ‘final’ and 
provide the following characterization: 
Something is of final epistemic value if and only if it is valuable in and of itself, 
or for its own sake, from the epistemic point of view. 
And, of course, to understand the overall epistemic value of consequences we need more than 
just the concept of final epistemic value. We need its contrary: 
Something is of final epistemic disvalue if and only if it is disvaluable in and of 
itself, or for its own sake, from the epistemic point of view.  
With the concepts of both final epistemic value and disvalue, we could provide an adequate 
characterization of the overall epistemic value of consequences in terms of them.1 
None of these distinctions, so far, tell us what is of final epistemic value. Of course, any time 
something is of final epistemic value there is some fact or obtaining state of affairs specifying 
that the thing is of final epistemic value. So, alternatively put, none of these distinctions so far 
tell us what the facts of final epistemic value are. There is a general, though not exceptionless, 
consensus that truth is important for final epistemic value and falsehood is important for final 
epistemic disvalue. For purposes here, we can assume just a simple formulation of this idea to 
grease the wheels of discussion: 
(T) If a belief is true, then it is of final epistemic value.  
As this claim is merely illustrative, it doesn’t matter if it is true for our purposes here. So I won’t 
defend it. 
II. Formal Conception of Final Epistemic Value 
I’ve characterized final epistemic value in terms of the epistemic point of view. But none of 
these terms are ordinary ones, even if what they refer to might be commonplace. 
Consequentially, it is important to further develop a conception of final epistemic value. In this 
section, I will exposit what I call the Formal Conception of final epistemic value.  
The Formal Conception of final epistemic value embraces several theses. First:  
Epistemic Point of View: The epistemic point of view contains true statements 
expressing the standards for epistemic evaluation. 
                                                 
1 Actually, as I’ve argued elsewhere, a fully adequate characterization would need a further distinction between 
basic and non-basic value that cuts across the final epistemic value/disvalue distinction. However, I won’t focus on 





Since I am focusing on epistemic value, I am focusing on a subset of the epistemic point of view 
that states the standards for epistemic value. Since I am assuming (T), I am also assuming (T) is 
part of the epistemic point of view. 
Second, a claim about the structure of justification internal to the Epistemic Point of View: 
Axiomatic Justification: Some of the statements in the epistemic value point of 
view are justified in virtue of their relation to other statements in the epistemic 
value point of view; but some are not. 
So the epistemic value point of view has something like an axiomatic structure. There are some 
statements in it that have an “axiomatic” status; they are not justified by appealing to anything 
else in the point of view. Other statements have a “theorem” status; they are justified by 
appealing to one of the axiomatic statements. The simplest way to justify a theorem is good ole 
fashioned deduction. But there might be looser ways of justifying it as well.2  
Some authors might prefer the more modern terminology of “fundamental” and “derived.” 
Some of the statements in the epistemic point of view are “fundamental” in that they are not 
justified in virtue of their relation to other statements in the epistemic point of view. Other 
statements in the epistemic point of view are “derived” in that they are justified in virtue of their 
relation to other statements in the epistemic point of view (How they are “derived” is an issue we 
don’t have to settle here; many views are possible.) Using this language, we could then say that 
certain values or obligations are “fundamental” where this means that they are referred to by at 
least one fundamental statement in the epistemic point of view. I do not think anything turns on 
whether we used “axiomatic/theorem” language or “fundamental/derived” language. The 
important point is that the standards in the epistemic point of view have an internal structure.  
The next two claims require a little setup. Contrary to error-theorists (e.g., Mackie (1977) 
and others (e.g., Geach (1956), Thomson (2008), Kraut (2011)), I accept the existence of final 
value (sometimes also called intrinsic value or absolute goodness). I will not defend this view, 
simply noting that I don’t find criticisms of this view persuasive.  
I characterize final value as follows:  
Something is of final value if and only if it is appropriate or correct to value it for 
its own sake or in and of itself.  
By ‘to value’ here I have in mind a range of pro-attitudes that include things like: liking, caring 
about, desiring, admiring, advocating for, enjoying, taking pleasure in, etc. Lot of philosophers 
who accept the existence of final value might fuss with this approximation, even if they agree 
with the general idea. Specifically, they might disagree about whether the right way to “connect” 
final value to valuing is by appealing to what is “appropriate or correct.” For instance, they might 
say instead that something is of final value if and only if we ought to value it; or there is reason 
to value it; or it is rational to value it; etc. This inhouse fight doesn’t matter here.  
Third, the Formal Conception takes a stand on the relationship between final epistemic value 
and final value (or final value simpliciter). The Formal Conception contains the following two 
theses:  
Kind Failure: Final epistemic value is not a kind or subspecies of final value. 
Implication Failure: Being of final epistemic value does not imply being of final 
value.  
                                                 
2 These points are consistent with the “axioms” having some potential reductive explanation—that explanation 
simply won’t be part of the epistemic point of view. Additionally, for a statement to be an “axiom” of the epistemic 
point of view, there might be further requirements that merely not being justified by something inside the epistemic 




Implication Failure is weaker than Kind Failure. Having one property might imply having 
another because the former is a type or kind of the latter. But having one property might imply 
having another without the former being a type or kind of the latter. Being crimson implies being 
red and being extended; but while being crimson is a type or kind of being red it is not a type or 
way of being extended. As I formulate it, the Formal Conception embraces both of these theses.  
To be clear, it is consistent with Formal Conception that somethings are both of final 
epistemic value and final value. But this would not necessarily be because those things have the 
property of being of final epistemic value. On the Formal Conception, there is no conceptual, 
metaphysical, or deep causal connection between the properties of final epistemic value and final 
value. An analogy. One could imagine the “white supremacist” point of view that articulate the 
standards for white supremacy. And that point of view might imply that the experiences of 
pleasure of some whites is of final white supremacist value. And, as a matter of fact, those 
experiences of pleasure might also be of final value. But this wouldn’t be of final value because 
they are of final white supremacy value; it is merely because there is coincidental overlap with 
final value.  
We can now see why I call this conception of epistemic value a “formal” conception. On it, 
certain statements—including perhaps (T)—play a purely “formal role” inside the epistemic 
point of view. They are used to justify statements about epistemic standard inside the epistemic 
point of view. But as these last two theses make clear, on their own, they play no role in 
connecting epistemic value to final value.  
Several authors endorse the Formal Conception or something close enough.3 Consider the 
following discussion from Ernest Sosa. He begins by reminding us that:  
We humans are zestfully judgmental across the gamut of our experience: in art, 
literature, science, politics, sports, food, wine, and even coffee; and so on, across 
many domains. (2007: 70)  
He continues: 
Any such domain of human experience admits values of two sorts: the derivative, 
and the fundamental—that is to say, the derivative or fundamental for that 
domain. A value might be irreducible to other values distinctive of a given 
domain, without being fundamental absolutely…  
Sosa goes on to consider whether only truth is of the fundamental epistemic value. In describing 
issues regarding this view, he writes: 
Truth may or may not be intrinsically valuable absolutely, who knows? Our worry 
requires only that we consider truth the epistemically fundamental value, the 
ultimately explainer of other distinctively epistemic values (2007: 72).  
Similar claims can be found in other authors. Here is Duncan Pritchard.  
When I say that truth is the fundamental epistemic good, I mean that from a 
purely epistemic point of view it is ultimately only truth that we should care 
about… A key point to note about treating truth as a finally epistemically valuable 
good is that it does not follow that truth is finally valuable simplicter. For 
instance, it does not follow that the truth always generates a pro tanto goodness. 
The point is just that from a purely epistemic point of view truth is rightly to be 
                                                 
3 At some points, Sosa seems more indifferent as to whether Implication Failure is true, as opposed to an 
outright rejection of it. But I take it that one way of showing that he should not be indifferent is to refine his view as 





valued non-instrumentally. But this is entirely consistent with arguing that the 
general view of truth is merely instrumental (or indeed, that it has no value at all). 
(2014: 113). 
In a slightly earlier work, Pritchard characterize “fundamental epistemic goods” as “any 
epistemic good whose epistemic value is at least sometimes not simply instrumental value 
relative to a further epistemic good” (2010: 11-12). He claims that “the very idea of there being 
such a thing as epistemic value… presupposes that some epistemic goods are fundamental. 
Something, after all, needs to act as the terminus for the instrumental regress of epistemic value” 
(2010: 12). Nonetheless, “while a fundamental epistemic good can act as the terminus of the 
instrumental regress of epistemic value, this is entirely compatible with that good not being 
finally valuable simpliciter” (2010: 12).  
Sosa and Pritchard endorse the Formal Conception, or something close enough. I highlight 
them because of their prominence. But they are not alone. A number of other authors have 
suggested similar views; see, inter alia, Resnik (1994: 35), Matheson (2011: 391-2), McHugh 
(2012: 22-3), Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a: 21; 2013b: 158-9), Ridge (2013: 194ff.), Sylvan (2018: 385).  
III. Against the Formal Conception 
In this section, I criticize the Formal Conception. First, I raise a flat-footed objection that the 
Formal Conception fails to imply that it is appropriate to care about the fact that some things are 
of epistemic value. While I find this objection compelling, others might think it a boon that it 
lacks this implication. For, if the Formal Conception lacks this implication, people may continue 
to theorize about epistemic value while immunizing themselves from skepticism about final 
value. I then argue that this is a mistake—the Formal Conception naturally undercuts the 
significance of theorizing about epistemic value. It is thus not a boon to lack this implication.  
A. A Flat-footed Objection 
Suppose I am unconcerned about epistemic value. I concede that various things have 
epistemic value. But I am not interested in having them for that reason; I neither desire them nor 
seek after them; I am not pleased when I learn something is of epistemic value; and I have no 
interested in promoting those things of epistemic value. Am I making a mistake? Is there 
something incorrect or defective or problematic about my attitudes, even if only slightly so? 
Would my lack of care tell you something about my virtues or vices? If the Formal Conception is 
correct, the answers to these questions are negative. I am not making a mistake; there is nothing 
problematic, defective, or incorrect about my attitudes; and my lack of concern tells you little 
about my virtues or vices. However, I think such a person would be making a mistake; that there 
is something incorrect about such a lack of concern. For this reason, I reject the Formal 
Conception.  
Let me clarify this objection. When I speak about being concerned about epistemic value, I 
have I mind not just caring about individual things that are of epistemic value but caring about 
the fact that such things have epistemic value.4 Something might be of final epistemic value and 
also of final value or even instrumental value. In such a situation, a person might care about that 
thing but only because it is of final value. But this doesn’t mean that they care about the fact that 
the thing is of final epistemic value. 
This clarification defuses a potential rejoinder to this flat-footed objection. Some 
philosophers claim that true beliefs are of final epistemic value and false beliefs are of final 
                                                 
4 I will not distinguish very carefully because the fact that something is of final epistemic value and its having 





epistemic disvalue. They then provide the following story. Having true beliefs, instead of false 
beliefs, helps contribute to living longer. (Usually reference is made to Quine’s pithy, though 
characteristically lax, statement that “Creatures inveterately wrong in their inductions have a 
pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproducing their kind” (1969: 126).) Finally, 
these philosophers might claim that living longer is, in general, valuable. Thus, they might claim 
it is appropriate and correct to value true belief; in general not doing so does reveal something of 
one’s character, namely, a lack of concern for one’s future well-being. 
For sake of discussion, let’s grant that living longer is, in general, valuable and true beliefs, 
in general, are more likely to lead to living longer than false beliefs. Nonetheless, none of this 
indicates that it is correct to value final epistemic value. For the fact that true beliefs are of final 
epistemic value, and false beliefs are of final epistemic disvalue, is entirely epiphenomenal to 
this story. Otherwise put, this story—if successful—might explain why it would be correct to 
value true beliefs (at least instrumentally), but it would not explain why it would be correct to 
value the fact that true beliefs are of final epistemic value.  
I’ve characterized final value as something that is appropriate to value for its own sake, so 
that not valuing it is, in one sense, a mistake. Given this characterization of final value, 
proponents of the Formal Conception do not accept:  
If X is of final epistemic value, then it is appropriate to value X for its own sake. 
But they might still accept that there is some connection between epistemic value and valuing. 
They might propose one of the following two principle as explaining that connection:  
If X is of final epistemic value, then it is appropriate to epistemically value X for 
its own sake 
 
If X is of final epistemic value, then it is epistemically appropriate to value X for 
its own sake. 
Let’s take these proposals in turn.  
First, as noted above, when I take of “valuing”—or the perfect tense ‘value’—I have in mind 
adopting a valuing attitudes or pro-attitude such as liking, caring about, being concerned with, 
desiring, advocating for, being in favor of, admiring, etc. Thus, when it is appropriate or correct 
to value something, that means it is appropriate to adopt some of these attitudes towards that 
thing. However, the first proposal refers to “epistemically value X.” That, in turn, suggests that 
among the pro-attitudes there are some that are the “epistemically valuing” attitudes in contrast 
to the “ethically valuing” attitudes or the “politically valuing” attitudes, etc. But I confess I can’t 
make sense of that idea. None of these attitudes seem especially “epistemic” or “ethical” or 
“political” or whatever. They are all attitudes that can be had towards a range of things. So I 
can’t make sense of this first proposal because I can’t make sense of the idea of a distinctive 
range of “epistemically valuing” attitudes.  
The second proposal does not suffer from that problem. When it refers to “value X” it can 
have in mind any or all of the pro-attitudes. It says that sometimes these pro-attitudes can be 
“epistemically appropriate.” The problem with this proposal is trying to understand the idea of 
some pro-attitudes being “epistemically appropriate” (as well as its contrary “epistemically 
inappropriate”).  
One proposal might be this: 
A pro-attitude directed towards something is epistemically appropriate if and only 




the attitude has property P, (where ‘P’ name some property that explains what 
makes the attitude epistemically appropriate). 
We don’t really have to evaluate potential candidates for P here. For this proposal is inconsistent 
with the Formal Conception, specifically Implication Failure. From the claim that something is 
of final epistemic value, it will follow that it is epistemically appropriate to value it for its own 
sake; from the claim that it is epistemically appropriate to value it for its own sake, it follows that 
it is appropriate to value it for its own sake; and from the claim that it is appropriate to value it 
for its own sake, it follows that it is of final value. But this contradicts Implication Failure.   
An alternative proposal might be this: 
If one is using the epistemic point of view, then it is appropriate to value for its 
own sake what the epistemic point of view identifies as being of final epistemic 
value.  
This may be what Duncan Pritchard has in mind when he writes, “The point is just that from a 
purely epistemic point of view truth is rightly to be valued non-instrumentally” (2014: 113).  
I understand this proposal and do not think it is logically inconsistent with the Formal 
Conception. Nonetheless, it is quite implausible. The basic problem is that even if a point of 
view identifies something of its kind of final value and you are using that point of view, it does 
not follow that it is appropriate to value for its own sake whatever that point of view identifies as 
valuable. Here’s an obvious example. Suppose Andrew is using the white supremacist point of 
view. And the white supremacist point of view identifies intimidating ethnic minorities and 
immigrants as being of final white supremacist value. In no way does it follow that it would be 
appropriate for Andrew to value the intimidation of ethnic minorities and immigrants, regardless 
of what point of view Andrew is using.  
Summing up, the Formal Conception fails to imply that it would be appropriate or correct to 
value the fact that things are of epistemic value. Since I think we should care about such facts, 
insofar as we can, I think we should reject the Formal Conception.  
However, some proponents of the Formal Conception might have a different perspective. 
They might take it as a boon that they reject Implication Failure. For they might be worried 
about skepticism about final value.5 Endorsing the Formal Conception may be a gambit to 
simultaneously allow for theorizing about what is of final epistemic value while immunizing 
such theories from worries about final value. However, I will now argue that this gambit won’t 
pay off. Endorsing the Formal Conception naturally undercuts the philosophical significance of 
disputes about what is of epistemic value.  
B. The Formal Conception and Other Points of View 
To introduce this objection,6 let us start with perhaps the major problem in contemporary 
work on epistemic value. The problem takes for granted three assumptions: 
True beliefs are of final epistemic value. 
Knowledge is of final epistemic value. 
Knowledge is of more final epistemic value than the corresponding true belief. 
                                                 
5 For instance, the skepticism might be generated by some commitment to naturalism. I don’t have the space to 
discuss naturalism and epistemic value here; though I do in Perrine (2017: 253-279).  
6 The objection here takes inspiration from Stich (1990). However, Stich discussion is ultimately unsuccessful 
for he fails to carefully distinguish between truth and reference relations. See Goldman (1991), Alston (1996), and 
Perrine (2017: 246-252). A similar type of argumentative strategy to mine is used by Oliveira (2017: 499-503), 




The problem is to explain how each of these assumptions are true together or, if they are not all 
true, which assumption should be rejected. 
I’ll mention three potential solutions. One potential solution is to argue that knowledge has 
some further condition besides true belief and that meeting this condition is a fundamental final 
epistemic value distinct from true belief. This is, essentially, Sosa (2007)’s solution. Sosa’s 
solution amounts to maintaining that knowledge requires apt belief and that apt belief is, like true 
belief, a fundamental epistemic value (2007: 87-8). A second solution reject the third 
assumption. Instead, it maintains that frequently knowledge is of more instrumental epistemic 
value than true belief, but is not itself always or even frequently of more final epistemic value 
than true belief. This solution is, more or less, that of Goldman and Olson (2009). A third 
solution rejects the first assumption. Instead, it claims that justified belief (not true belief) is a 
fundamental epistemic value and claims that justified belief is necessary for knowledge. Though 
not presented in quite this way, Feldman (2002) contains such a solution.  
Earlier I said that the epistemic point of view contains the standards for epistemic 
evaluation. We can understand these different solutions as being equivalent to making claims 
about the epistemic point of view and its axiomatic standards. The first solution says that the 
epistemic point of view contains as a further axiomatic standard besides (T) something like: 
(A) Apt beliefs are of final epistemic value. 
The second solution, among other things, denies that (A) is a further axiomatic standard in the 
epistemic point of view. The third solution denies that (T) is an axiomatic standard of the 
epistemic point of view to begin with and proposes in its place: 
(J) Justified beliefs are of final epistemic value. 
However, at this point, let us consider some parody proposals. According to the first parody 
proposal, Sosa is correct about the epistemic point of view and the axiomatic statements of it. 
However, on this proposal, there is also the epistemic* point of view that contains the standards 
for epistemic* evaluation. It also has an axiomatic justification structure. Additionally, according 
to it, there is only one axiomatic statement: 
(T*) True beliefs are of final epistemic* value. 
And, like epistemic value given the Formal Conception, when something is of final epistemic* 
value it does not follow that it is of final value. 
According to the second parody proposal, Sosa is correct about the epistemic point of view 
and the axiomatic statements of it. However, on this proposal, there is also the epistemic** point 
of view that contains the standards for epistemic** evaluation. It also has an axiomatic 
justification structure. Additionally, according to it, there is only one axiomatic statement: 
(J**) Justified beliefs are of final epistemic** value.  
And, like epistemic value given the Formal Conception, when something is of final epistemic** 
value it does not follow that it is of final value. 
Each of these parody proposals has the same structure. It concedes that some author—e.g., 
Sosa—is right about the epistemic point of view and what has final epistemic value. It then 
articulates an alternative point of view concerning a different kind of value, understood in terms 
of that point of view, where the things that have that kind of value are different from the things 
that have final epistemic value. Using parody proposals, we can construct a proliferation of 
points of views with their associated values.  
However, given this proliferation of points of views, with their different value properties, a 
natural question is whether any of them should be privileged over others. For each of these 




views about the distribution of epistemic value, there is no disagreement. The potential 
disagreement is about which point of view should be utilized and adopted. Is there anything 
about the epistemic point of view that privileges, vindicates, or otherwise legitimates it over 
these other points of views? Something that would explain why someone who opted out of the 
epistemic point of view for the (e.g.) epistemic** point of view was making a mistake? My 
contention is that if the Formal Conception is true, then nothing would privilege it.  
But philosophical disputes about epistemic value are significant only if the epistemic point 
of view is privileged. For philosophical disputes about epistemic value are significant only if it is 
important to use the epistemic point of view over others. After all, as the parody proposals 
illustrate, it is possible for us to evaluate the world in various ways, even ways that parody or 
mimic participants in disputes about epistemic value. And it is important for us to use the 
epistemic point of view over others only if it is privileged over these other points of view. But if 
the Formal Conception is true, then the epistemic point of view is not privileged over others.  
Thus, the Formal Conception naturally undercut the significance of philosophical disputes 
about epistemic value. To be clear, one could still participate in such disputes (perhaps such 
participation is amusing or is useful for livelihood). But given the Formal Conception, any such 
bold proclamations about the profound significance of such debates, that philosophers tend to 
make, cannot be substantiated.  
Proponents of the Formal Conception might propose several ways of trying to privilege the 
epistemic point of view over others. First, someone like Sosa (2007) might argue that one cannot 
use the epistemic* point of view to resolve the problem we started with. And this provides a 
reason to prefer using the epistemic point of view over the epistemic* point of view. Sosa’s right 
that one cannot use the epistemic* point of view to resolve that problem. That’s because that 
point of view is not concerned with epistemic value. But he’s wrong that this provides a reason 
to prefer the epistemic point of view over the epistemic* point of view. For the epistemic point 
of view cannot be used to solve problems about epistemic* value.  
Second, someone like Pritchard (2014) might claim that the activity of inquiry provides a 
reason to prefer the epistemic point of view over others like the epistemic* point of view. Inquiry 
is a goal-directed activity that is successful when it achieves its goal. And the goal of inquiry is 
co-extensive with what is of final epistemic value. So, someone like Pritchard might claim, this 
gives us a reason for preferring the epistemic point of view over other points of view like the 
epistemic* point of view. However, we can concede all these points about inquiry, but they do 
not provide a reason for preferring the epistemic point of view over others. For let us consider 
inquiry*. Inquiry* is a goal-directed activity that is successful when it achieves its goal. And the 
goal of inquiry* is co-extensive with what is of final epistemic* value. But so far we’ve been 
given no reason to privilege inquiry over inquiry*. So appealing to a connection between inquiry 
and final epistemic value will not help.  
Finally, proponents of the Formal Conception might appeal to broadly pragmatic features. 
They might propose that we are already using the epistemic point of view, instead of others. Or 
perhaps it might be more difficult to use other points of view like the epistemic** point of view. 
Or maybe people just prefer the epistemic point of view over others for whatever reason.  
It is not obvious that these claims about pragmatic features are correct. (For instance, it has 
proven quite elusive to adequately analyze the contemporary concept of knowledge; maybe a 
point of view without such a concept would be more useful.) But let’s concede them for sake of 
discussion. One issue is that these pragmatic features are highly variable and contingent. They 




now, but not for tomorrow; it might work for some populations, but not others. A different issue 
is that this response is conservative. Individuals or communities can keep using their certain 
points of views because that’s what they’ve always done; but bolder individuals or community 
might opt for different ones. Variety is the spice of life they say.  
Additionally, some philosophers—like Pritchard (2010: 16-18)—find unsatisfying views 
that maintain that knowledge is not more epistemically valuable than true belief but only more 
practically valuable than true belief. However, it would be very hard to maintaining that view 
while also maintaining the view that the primary reason why we should stick with the epistemic 
point of view, and epistemic value, are practical and pragmatic reasons! 
Let me sum up the dialectic at this point. First, I argued that, given the Formal Conception, it 
is not appropriate or inappropriate to not care about epistemic value. Since, I claim, it is 
appropriate to care about epistemic value, there is reason for rejecting the Formal Conception. 
Second, I considered a response by proponents of the Formal Conception who prefer to distance 
themselves from claims about final value so as to make way for important theorizing about what 
is of epistemic value. I’ve argued that this gambit fails. For the Formal Conception fails to give 
priority to the epistemic point of view over others.  
IV. A Hybrid Conception? 
I formulated the Formal Conception as embracing two theses:  
Kind Failure: Final epistemic value is not a kind or subspecies of final value. 
Implication Failure: Being of final epistemic value does not imply being of final 
value.  
However, one might consider a view that accepts the first thesis while rejecting the second 
thesis. I will call such a position a Hybrid Conception of epistemic value, since it combines 
elements of both the Formal Conception and my preferred alternative, the Simpliciter 
Conception.  
One might develop the Hybrid Conceptions in various ways. For the sake of moving 
discussion forward, I’ll consider one specific way of developing it in along broadly 
“constitutive” lines. This way of developing the Hybrid Conception will have three additional 
theses. First, the standards of the epistemic point of view is “constituted” by our psychological 
states (such as beliefs) or psychological activities (such as reasoning). Second, since those states 
or activities are universal for human beings, who meet certain conditions, the epistemic point of 
view is likewise universal for such human beings. In this way, the standards of the epistemic 
point of view are inescapable for human beings like us (who meet the relevant conditions). 
Finally, the relevant properties in the standards do not bear any conceptual, metaphysical, or 
deep causal relations to their counterpart properties. So, on this approach, final epistemic value 
does not bear any conceptual, metaphysical, or deep causal relations to final value. In slogan 
form, on this approach to developing the Hybrid Conception, epistemic normativity is 
constitutive normativity and constitutive normativity ain’t real normativity.7 
I will briefly argue that the Hybrid Conception —including the constitutive way of 
developing it—do not avoid my objections to the Formal Conception.  
                                                 
7 I focus on this approach as it is the one suggested to me by the reviewer. The idea that beliefs have a 
constitutive standard was popularized by Shah (2003) and Shah and Velleman (2005); though see also Railton 
(2003) and Flowerree (2018). Chan (2014) contains a relatively recent overview of the issues. The constitutive 
approach in ethics was popularized by Korsgaard (2009) and Velleman (2000); though see also Katsafanas (2013). 




First, the Hybrid Conception merely in virtue of rejecting Implication Failure does not avoid 
my first objection to the Formal Conception. To see this, recall the White Supremacist example. 
The White Supremacist point of view may identify something as being of final white supremacist 
value. And that thing may be of final value. But insofar as it is of final value it is not because it is 
also of final white supremacist value. After all, the property of being of final white supremacist 
value bears no conceptual, metaphysical, or deep causal relations to final value. There is merely 
overlap here, nothing more. 
Likewise, even if the Hybrid Conception rejects Implication Failure, that rejection by itself 
is insufficient to avoid my first objection. For even if Implication Failure is false, there may still 
be no conceptual, metaphysical, or deep causal relations between final epistemic value and final 
value. To be sure, there would be a total modal overlap—any time something is of final 
epistemic value, it is also of final value. But for all that has been said, it may still be that such 
overlap is merely a modal overlap and nothing more. Additionally, appealing to the constitutive 
way of developing the Hybrid Conception does not help. For, on the formulation used here, it 
explicitly denies that there are any conceptual, metaphysical, or deep causal relations between 
final epistemic value and final value.  
One might consider an important variant of the constitutive way of developing the Hybrid 
Conception. On this variant, meeting the constitutive standards for certain states (e.g. beliefs) or 
activities (e.g. reasoning) does bear conceptual, metaphysical, or deep causal relations to what is 
of final value. But it would be hard to see how to plausibly develop this view. In general, from 
the mere fact that state or activity has a constitutive standard, it does not follow that such states 
or activities have any final value. After all, there are many deplorable, disgraceful, or otherwise 
disgusting states or activities with constitutive standards—ethnic cleansing comes easily to 
mind—but from the mere fact one has those states, or is engaging in those activities, clearly 
nothing about final value follows.8  
These points hold even if the relevant state or activity is inescapable for the agent.9 After all, 
pointing out that something is inescapable for an agent is not necessarily a way of vindicating it; 
it may be a way of revealing one’s plight. To use a literary example, Sisyphus is cursed by Zeus 
to roll a boulder up a hill for all eternity. We may even suppose that Zeus makes certain desires 
and intentions to roll the boulder up the hill inescapable for Sisyphus as well. So for Sisyphus, 
there are certain actions, desires, and intentions for him that are inescapable. And, I may 
concede, those actions, desires, and intentions may have their own constitutive standards. But 
none of that would show that Sisyphus’ activity was of any great value. And, in his more 
reflective moments, he might ask whether he has reason to engage these activities—he doesn’t 
suddenly (mysteriously?) lose the ability to ask such questions simply because these activities 
                                                 
8 Katsafanas (2013: 48-52) may disagree, claiming that engaging in an action with a constitutive aim 
automatically generates a reason to achieve that aim. In brief response, first, Katsafanas doesn’t response to the 
obviously disturbing implications of this claim that, on their own, seem sufficient to reject it. Second, Katsafanas’ 
argument assumes both that (i) a request for a reason to act (in general) requires an alternative, and (ii) there isn’t an 
alternative to action (in general). Both assumptions are false. I argue against the first below. The second is also false, 
since the alternative to action is a state of non-action. Katsafanas responds that to get to a state of non-action may 
requires an action (2013: 52). That response is a non-sequitur. It confuses the necessary means to achieve an 
alternative with the alternative itself. Even if some type of action is necessary to get to a state of non-action, that 
doesn’t show that non-action is not an alternative to action or that this question becomes meaningless. Compare: a 
military commander may ask whether he has reasons to commit troops to a particular location. This question is 
meaningful even if the only way to safely withdraw troops from that location is to, first, commit more troops.  




are inescapable for him. And he might, rightly, conclude he has no reason to perform them and 
rightly wish—or even desire—not to have his fate. Thus, even if certain states (beliefs) or 
activities (reasoning) have constitutive standards and are inescapable for human persons like you 
or I, it would not thereby follow that meeting those standards bears any conceptual, 
metaphysical, or deep causal connections to final value.  
Additionally, I don’t think that the constitutive approach to developing the Hybrid 
Conception avoids my second objection to the Formal Conception. At first blush, it may seem to 
avoid it. For, one might claim, what “privileges” the epistemic point of view, over others, is that 
the epistemic point of view is the one that is constituted by our actual states (beliefs) or activities 
(reasoning). In other worlds, the epistemic point of view is privileged over others because it is 
“inescapable” for human beings like us, with our states and activities. 
But from the mere fact that some point of view is inescapable for us may not be sufficient to 
vindicate a choice of it over other points of views. Inescapability is normatively neutral. 
Additionally, upon considering other points of view, we might prefer them and thus try to resists 
utilizing the standards of the epistemic point of view. Of course, if the constitutive approach to 
the Hybrid Conception is correct, we will never be able to fully avoid the epistemic point of 
view. But we can still adopt other points of view as well. 
To illustrate my response, let us suppose that given our evolutionary history—something 
beyond the control of any of us—human beings are innately disposed to reason in a certain way. 
Specifically, we are innately disposed to use “in-group” reasoning, where individuals are given 
preference in action and thought simply in virtue of arbitrary features that are similar to whatever 
agent happens to be reasoning. There are, we may suppose, constitutive standards for “in-group” 
reasoning; not just any form of reasoning could be “in-group” reasoning. For human beings such 
as ourselves, these dispositions to “in-group” reason might be inescapable. But we still might not 
see that as any reason to privilege them. In fact, we might take steps to avoid, mitigate, or 
compensate for such reasoning.  
A final, more extreme illustration. Suppose I am—ala Dr. Frankenstein—in the business of 
creating some new creatures. I recognize that running and slithering are different ways of 
moving, each with their own constitutive standards. Nonetheless, noting the differences by itself 
wouldn’t settle which way of moving would be more preferable, good, or ideal for my new 
creatures. Likewise, I might recognize that believing and “delieving”—a state similar to 
believing but distinct10—are different psychological states, each with its own constitutive 
standards enshrined in distinct points of view. Nonetheless, noting the differences by itself 
wouldn’t settle which way of designing the psychology of these creatures would be more 
preferable, good, or ideal.11 Thus, even if there are constitute standards for our states or activities, 
and even if they are inescapable for us, and even if those standards are enshrined in the epistemic 
point of view, this need not be enough to vindicate the epistemic point of view over others.  
                                                 
10 For instance, perhaps delieving functionally interacts with imagination differently than beliefs do. (While I 
can imagine what I believe to be false, I cannot imagine what I delieving to be false.) Or perhaps, unlike beliefs, in 
rare circumstances I can delieving at will.  
11 Some authors suggest that the question of whether or not there is reason to be an agent—to act—is 
unintelligible (cf., e.g., Ferrero (2009: 311), Katsafanas (2013: 52-3), Silverstein (2015: 1136f.)). For they suggest it 
requires a person who is not an agent asking a question, but asking a question is an activity which requires agency. 
Presumably they would suggest the question of whether there is reason to be a believer—to believe—is likewise 
unintelligible. For the record, these questions seem perfectly intelligible to me (cf. Railton (2003: 315), Enoch 
(2011: 223ff.)). But by framing this last example in terms of third-person concerns, instead of first-person ones, we 




Proponents of the Hybrid Conception—and this constitutive approach to developing it—
may have their responses. But I hope to have provide enough justification for an alternative 
approach, which I know turn to.  
V. The Simpliciter Conception 
In this section, I want to sketch an alternative account. I’ll call it the Simpliciter Conception. 
The Simpliciter Conception embraces the first two claims of the Formal Conception:  
Epistemic Point of View: The epistemic point of view contains statements 
expressing the standards for epistemic evaluation. 
Axiomatic Justification: Some of the statements in the epistemic value point of 
view are justified in virtue of their relation to other statements in the epistemic 
value point of view; but some are not. 
However, it rejects the next two claims:  
Kind Failure: Final epistemic value is not a kind or subspecies of final value. 
Implication Failure: Being of final epistemic value does not imply being of final 
value. 
Instead it embraces: 
Kind Inclusion: Final epistemic value is a kind or subspecies of final value 
Implication: Being of final epistemic value does imply being of final value. 
The Simpliciter Conception gets its name because it maintains that final epistemic value is kind 
of final value or value simpliciter. The general picture here is that there is such a thing as final 
value that sub-divides into distinct categories with final epistemic value being one such 
category.12  
The Simpliciter Conception avoids the issue plaguing the Formal Conception. The flat-
footed objection was that the Formal Conception did not imply that it is appropriate to care about 
epistemic value. The Simpliciter Conception does imply this. Given it, if something is of final 
epistemic value, then it is of final value. And if it is of final value, then it is appropriate to care 
about it.  Additionally, I complained that it was hard to make sense of the idea of it being 
“epistemically appropriate” to value something. However, given the Simpliciter Conception, a 
natural account is available. Some things are of final value; it is appropriate to value them. It is 
epistemically appropriate to value something just when it is of final epistemic value, which is a 
subset of final value. The qualifier ‘epistemically’ doesn’t mark out a special kind of 
“appropriateness” or a special kind of valuing attitude; it merely marks out the object of the 
attitude.  
Turning to the sophisticated objection, the Simpliciter Conception opens up a move that the 
Formal Conception does not. Some points of view do not “track” anything of value simpliciter; 
some do. According to the Simpliciter Conception, final epistemic value is a kind of final value. 
Thus, the epistemic point of view, which is concerned with final epistemic value, tracks what is 
of final value. There’s no reason to think that the other points of view do. Thus, there is reason to 
prioritize the epistemic point of view over others—it, at least partially, tracks what is of final 
value.  
                                                 
12 These ideas are not without precedent, though they are not always developed rigorously. Aristotle might be 
read this way things that are good in themselves are sufficiently diverse as to not be explained by participating in a 
single form of the good (see NE I.6, 1096b) and that “of excellence there are two species, the moral and the 
intellectual” (EE II.1, 1220a1,5). Ross (1939: 290), Frankena (1973: 60ff.) Zimmermann (2001: 25-6), Adams 
(1999: 4, 22, 35, 38, 41), Lynch (2004: 13) also suggest similar ideas. Though there is not a single page number that 




VI. Metanormativity  
In this final section, I’m going to relate the Simpliciter Conception to various issues in what 
can be called, for lack of a better word, “meta-normativity.” I do not have the space to defend 
some of the more controversial positions. I’m rather more interested in exploring what kinds of 
views best fit with the Simpliciter Conception. To borrow a turn of phrase from Peter van 
Inwagen, I’ve argued for a view about final epistemic value, and I’m adopting some views about 
meta-normativity.  
A. The Domain of the Epistemic  
First, according to the Simpliciter Conception, final epistemic value is a kind of final value. 
But presumably there are other types of final value (e.g., final ethical value). One question is 
what demarcates final epistemic value from other types or kinds of final value; what demarcates 
the domain of the epistemic?  
While I have views about this, I don’t intend to exposit them here. But notice that this is a 
question for any theory of epistemic value that accepts the existence of epistemic value alongside 
the value of other things. Thus, proponents of the Formal Conception will also have to answer 
the question: what demarcates the domain of the epistemic? To be sure, they don’t have to 
answer the particular way that question takes shape, given the Simpliciter Conception. But they 
still must face the general question. So while proponents of the Simpliciter Conception will have 
to demarcate epistemic value from other things, so will everyone else.  
B. Extended Normative Pluralism  
Second, I have assumed that we can meaningfully speaker of final value simpliciter or san 
phrase. Indeed, on the view defended here, final value is presumably more conceptually basic 
than final epistemic value, with the latter being understood as a subset constructed out of the 
former. Some authors might be skeptical of this who are not yet error theorists. Specifically, 
consider a position sometimes referred to as “normative pluralism.” A cornerstone of this 
position is that there’s no such thing that we ought to do simpliciter or sans phrase, though there 
may be things we ought to do morally, prudentially, etc. (See, e.g., Copp (2007: chp. 9), Tiffany 
(2007), Sagdahl (2014), Baker (2018).)  
Now normative pluralism is not a position about final value simpliciter; it is a position about 
ought simpliciter. But presumably proponents of normative pluralism would extend their position 
to other (broadly speaking) normative properties like value properties. (For instance, they 
frequently extend their position to normative reasons so that there are no such thing as reasons 
simpliciter but rather moral or prudential reasons.) I’ll call extended normative pluralism a 
position that extends this idea to value, maintaining that there is no such thing as final value 
simpliciter or sans phrase (even if there are types of value with phrase) So understood, extended 
normative pluralism is inconsistent with the position here. 
However, extended normative pluralism is inconsistent with a basic assumption of my 
discussion, that there is such a thing as final value simpliciter. It is not necessarily inconsistent 
with my view about the relationship between final epistemic value and final value. So extended 
normative pluralism does not provide any reason to doubt my proposal in particular. Indeed, 
even proponents of the Formal Conception might reject it if they think there are reasons for 
accepting final value that are independent of issues about epistemic value. Additionally, there are 
reasons for rejecting normative pluralism—and presumably, by extension, extended normative 




(2013), Case (2016).) So I’ll simply note that the Simpliciter Conception I’m advocating for is 
inconsistent with extended normative pluralism.13 
C. Epistemology and Ethics 
Finally, it is relatively common to see ethics as studying final value. On my view, epistemic 
value—specifically final epistemic value—is a kind of final value. This naturally raises the 
question of what view on the relationship between ethics and epistemology comports well with 
the Simpliciter Conception.  
One can naturally generalize the distinction between Formal and Simpliciter Conceptions of 
epistemic value to other epistemic concepts. After all, epistemology does not just describe 
epistemic value. It is shot through with other concepts like epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic 
justification, epistemic obligations, epistemic reasons.14 For each of these concepts, one can 
consider Formal, Hybrid, and Simpliciter accounts. For instance, the Formal Conception of 
epistemic virtues might say that the epistemic point of view contains the standards for what 
constitutes an epistemic virtue; but it might deny that epistemic virtues are a kind or species of 
virtue more generally. One could also formulate a Simpliciter Conception of epistemic virtue that 
also includes the claim that epistemic virtues are a kind or species of virtue.  
Given a Simpliciter Conception of epistemic value, the most natural position is a Simpliciter 
Conception of these other concepts in epistemology. We might call this the “Unified Simpliciter 
Conception of Epistemology.” On it, epistemic reasons are a type or species of normative 
reasons more generally; epistemic virtues are a type or species of virtues more generally; etc. To 
use a slogan, the qualifier ‘epistemic’ doesn’t switch topics, it merely restricts our topic.  
The Unified Simpliciter Conception of Epistemology is a much stronger position that the 
Simpliciter Conception that I have been defending. For instance, the Simpliciter Conception of 
epistemic value I have been defending on its own takes no stand on these additional (apparently) 
normative categories. And it is possible that when we examine (e.g.) epistemic obligations we 
will find that they are importantly different from obligations simpliciter. Nonetheless, I suggest 
that given the Simpliciter Conception of epistemic value, the Unified Simpliciter Conception of 
Epistemology is quite natural.  
The Unified Simpliciter Conception is not without precedent. Both Chisholm (1991) and 
Zagzebski (1996) suggest that epistemic evaluation and concepts is a type or subspecies of 
ethical evaluation and concepts. If by “ethics” they have in mind something that includes the 
study of value simpliciter, virtue simpliciter, reason simpliciter, etc. then their views are very 
similar to the Unified Simpliciter Conception of Epistemology.  
More recent attention has come from work in meta-ethics or, perhaps better yet, meta-
normativity. Specifically, in his (2007), Terence Cuneo defended a version of moral realism by 
defending a version epistemic realism and arguing that if epistemic realism were false, then so 
would moral realism. In this way, moral realism and epistemic realism run “in parallel.” Cuneo’s 
work has generated a lot of work, with some authors defending the parallel (e.g., Bedke (2010), 
Case (2019), Cuneo and Kyriacou (2018), Das (2016, 2017), Rowland (2013, 2016)) and others 
criticizing it (e.g., Cowie (2014, 2016), Olson (2018)).  
                                                 
13 Notice that falsity of extended normative pluralism is still consistent with views on which value is 
“incommensurable.” On those views, some things are neither better, worse, or equal in value to other things of 
value. Rather, they may be “on a par” with them. These views are consistent with the falsity of extended normative 
pluralism because they can be understood as accepting final value or final value simpliciter but providing a more 
complex analysis of the comparison between things of value.  
14 And ordinary discourse has thicker concepts like being a blockhead, a dutiful inquirer, or a generous 




There are some differences between positions like Cuneo’s and Zagzebski’s. Zagzebski 
describes epistemology as a sub-branch of ethics. Cuneo describes two different positions—
epistemic realism and moral realism—and does not seem to identify one of them as being a part 
of the other. Nonetheless, this difference between authors may be primarily terminological. After 
all, it is clear that Cuneo thinks that epistemic and moral reasons share certain features—e.g., 
both are categorical. So presumably he would not object to an overarching subject matter that 
describes those shared features. This would puts his position quite close to what I’ve called the 
Unified Simpliciter Conception.  
Again, the Simpliciter Conception of epistemic value does not imply the Unified Simpliciter 
Conception. So one could embrace the Simpliciter Conception while rejecting the Unified 
Simpliciter Conception because one though (e.g.) epistemic reasons and moral reasons were 
fundamentally different. Nonetheless, the Simpliciter Conception does sit comfortably with this 
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